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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The Claimant-Appdiant ,\ppeais ,h-: foi!owing decision of the Idaho Industrial 
Commission: 
a. Did the industriai Commission err as a matter of law or abuse their discretion 
\Vhen they ruled that Claimanf s separation from employment \Vas a voluntary 
quit or alternatively that she did not possess good cause to separate from her 
employment? 
b. Did the Industrial Commission err as a matter of lavv or abuse their discretion 
\Vhen they placed the burden of proof and presentation on the Claimant to prO\ e 
the non-existence of misconduct? 
c. Did thl;:' lndu:,L · ( onrnii-<·.iun -:n de: ct matter of law or abuse their discretion 
\\ hen tht.·\· ruled that Claimanf s mistakes constituted misconduct for 
unemployment purposes·.' 
d. Did the Industrial Commission abuse their discretion or err as a matter of law 
when they detcnnin-.:,1 lh.: Claimant '.\~tS ineligible for unemployment benefits? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Claimant/Appellant Joan Thrall began work fiJr Respondent St. Luke's Health System in 
March of 2000. She made claical errors that led to disciplinarv action and retraining in mid 
0 --
2013. During this timt: Ms. Thrall was seeing her physician for physical issues and was working 
with her optometrist to improve her vision (Transcript of Hearing page 22 lines 20-22). Ms. 
Thrall worked with Respondent through coachings and counselings, putting her under added 
mental stress knowing her job was in jeopardy. At this time Ms. Thrall also applied for various 
other positions within the company in an attempt to continue her employment. Claimant was 
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suspended a vveek before her Ji:,d1<trge and her employment was discontinued when she returned 
on October fh 2013. 
On the da) of Ms. Thrairs separation from employment she was called into Respondent's 
office where she spoke with .Anne Sergeant. the assistant director of laboratory services and 
Brenda Miranda. the manager or the Boise laboratory of St. Luke's. Ms. Thrall's under oath 
testimony reflects that she vv~b i nforrned up~m entering the 1.)ffice that she was to be terminated 
immediately and \\as then given the option to resign immediately instead (Transcript of Hearing 
pages 21-22). Ms. Thrall \Aas a1.h i:,ed by Respondents that resignation \vas in her best interests 
and Respondent suggested that she put --personal n:asons" as the reason for her separation from 
employment (Transcript of H1.:..trn1h pag.: t 2. iines .:A-25 ). Upon Respondenfs urging. kno,\ing 
that she had no option to continue employment. Claimant filled out a resignation form and 
submitted it to Respondt:'nt. 
Claimant applied for unemployment effective October 61h 2013 but v,as determined to be 
ineligible for benefits after :he kL1hu Uepanrncnt of Labor contacted St. Luke's Representative 
Lacey Olson of human resource:; r<::gan.hng the separation from employment. Ms. Olson. who 
was not present during the office 1111:ding iu which the separation from employment occurred. 
informed the Idaho Department uf Labor that l'v1s. Thrall had .. voluntarily resigned due to 
personal reasons and that she \Vas nut going to be terminated:· (Exhibit 3 page 5 --Examiner 
Summary .. ) The IDOL determined that based on Respondenf s assertions and because Claimant 
could not provide proof that she \\as terminated or forced to resign. Claimant \Vas ineligible for 
unemployment benefits. 
Claimant appealed this decisiun and a telephonic hearing ,vas heard in front of Appeals 
Examiner Richmond. At hearing Respondenl testified that Claimant was to be terminated 
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immediately if she had not resigned. though Respondent did insist despite a lengthy discussion 
with Claimant com incing her to fill out a resignation form. that Claimant was unmvare of this 
fact. Appeals Examiner Richmond i,-:;:-,ued a dect:.:ion reinstating Claimant"s benefits and 
concluded. ··the emplnyer asked the -:Liimant tu re:;igri." ( Decision of Appeals Examiner. R .. Vol. 
1 p. 3 L. 13) and that .. a forced resignation i:-, \iewed as a discharge ... (Id at L 14) The Appeals 
examiner also concluded that the ·"i:mployer ha:-; prcsenkd no competent e,idence to show that 
the claimant did not perform her jGb duties a:-; expected or that she ,,vas discharged for 
misconduct. .... (Id at L. 16-17). This decision \vets appealed by the Respondent to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission (HC or Commission) who reversed the /\ppeals Examiner. concluding 
that Claimant ··voluntarily quit a job without good cause connected with the employment:· 
Claimant appeals the de....-i,;._;r; .,r th-:· UC to rln:o: t uud. 
A.RGlJMENT 
When rev1e\\ mg a <.kci:-:wn h, the InJu:-,lriai Commission. this Court exerctses free 
revie\v over the Commission·s conclusions of la½. but v,ill not disturb the Commission·s factual 
findings if they are supporte,l l·~, substanual c1nd competent e\ idence. LC. § 72-732: Stewart v. 
S'zm Valley Co .. 140 Idaho 381. 384 (2004 ). The facts remain relatively undisputed in this matter 
and so the Claimant seeks rulings on the Commissions conclusions of law. 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL C0\1T'v1ISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
WHEN THEY RULED THAT CL.\l\1ANT"S SEPARATION FROM 
EMPLOY MEi's l WA', A VOU.li\T 1\RY QUIT. 
The legal standard in Idaho for determining whether or not a separation from employment 
constitutes a discharge is not dependant on the use of formal words of firing. Jackson v. 
Alinidoka !rrigmivn Dist __ 98 Idaho :no ( 1977) The test employed is ··whether sufficient words 
or actions by the employer v..ould logicaily lead a prudent man to believe his tenure had been 
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tenninated:· !cl at 33--L 335. Tkit s,mit: Coun in Juckwn also concluded .. Employees are often 
asked to resign as opposed to being lir<.:d. Wnile this may be done for any number of reasons. the 
meaning is clear that the emplo:, ei;: is bcint;'. dismissed." Id at 335 
Other states h,ne 'vii.:.'\\l'O fr>rced resignations similarly. The Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island ruled in Kaner Womu11 & ln/c1111., Hwp. o/Rlwde !slond. 592 A.2d 137. 139 (R.L 1991) 
that a forced resignation is not a voluntary quit: 
if an employer tel is an employee tu resign or else he or she wili be terminated for 
misconduct such an action is not a vuiuntary resignation for purposes of§ 28-44-
17. Although employee in t!fr-, ca:-;c \,a::-; given the choice either to retire or to be 
fired. she did not CIWP:<: ) · { ,:·,,en ·,2s P.2d at 998. If the matter were up 
to her. she \\Ottld still r·e -:rnpluyed. 
The Commission erred as a maner of law when it disqualified Claimant from receiving 
unemployment benefib because --rhe record shows that Claimant ,vas mvare that she could either 
quit or be discharged. and. afl-l:t discus~in,.i the matk'r with Employer. she chose to resign ... She 
chose to quit." (R .. Vol. L r- .::::o. L 1 ll-l 5) 1 he Claimant entt.:red Respondent's office with no 
way to leave the room and continue \\1th her employment She had expressed a willingness to 
work with her employer and had already applied for other positions within the company in order 
to continue employm..:nt. L..:,,\, "'6 L.:r .:mpluy n:.:rn \'rith Respondent \\as t)Yer Claimant elected 
to do ,vhat her employer urged !,.:r t\J lh.1_ sign a letter of resignation. Hmvever. just as the 
claimant in Kane, if it were up tu the Ciaimant. she vvould still be employed. As stated in 
Jackson above. employers commonly ask their employees if they vvould prefer to resign as 
opposed to being fired. Procurin~ this pi1.:ce of paper from an employee on their way out the door 
does not constitute a shield that emplo)ers can tbe to circumvent Idaho"s unemployment laws. 
The Commission cited J!ine 1·. 7\rin F<.,lls County, 114 Idaho 244 (1988) in support of its 
proposition that quitting to avoid being discharged does not require that a matter be reviewed as a 
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discharge. In Hine. a claimant resigned ,vhen faced with criminal charges for embezzling funds 
from her employer. Putti ns :.1si<-k th,' lik·t that the case ma) hm e been more appropriately 
decided as a termination for rnisu111 duct and not a:,; a \oluntary quit. especially in light of other 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Coun such as Juckson that indicate forced resignations are 
equi\ alent to termination. the Court in iline detcrmined that the Claimant had options arnilable 
to her apart from irnrneJic1h.' :-.:--;ignmicl11 ,g The C\lurt opined in footnote 1 that the 
Claimant could have coo permed r'urth:.T ,, ith the im e::.tigation or remained silent and kept her 
employment albeit suspend;;:d. pending the resolution of the charges. The Claimant in the matter 
currently before the Court had no such options available to her that vvould allow her to remain 
employed for any time period. 
The HC also citeJ Re ( 1ailil u/ Reed 590 NYS2d 602 ( 1992) and Ganter v. 
l'nemployment Compensurion 8d OtRe1·inr 723 A.2d 272 (Pa Comnnv. Ct 1999) as persuasive 
authority that quitting to --avoid an imminent discharge"' can still bi: considered a voluntary quit 
(R .. Vol. l. P. 21-22). , ,~ 1 i n(·sc ,,th\..'r c::i--;,-::s ..:,ln be :uore aptl) summarized as standing for 
quitting lo avoid a potential <.ir pu:--:--:ihk discharge is considered a volur.tary quit. In Reed. for 
example. a Claimant's reason for quitting \\<as that she believed her department would be 
transferred and she might be unable to find a position in the new area. She was not informed she 
\Vas to be immediately terminated and as.ked to sign a resignation on the way out the door. In 
Ganter, a Claimant" s benefits were reinstated because she left her position due to her inability to 
care for her child and keep her employment The Court in its analysis mentions that quitting in 
anticipation of a possible termination is :.i voluntary quit. This separation from employment due 
to uncertain happenings iu the future ;.., a iar er) from the current matter before the Court. It must 
be noted that in both New York and Pe1111syl-,ania the law is clear regarding forced resignations: 
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Where a claimant is kft \\ ith the' Lkeision only to re-:,ign or bl? discharged immediately. the choice 
to resign is not a voluntary separation from emplo: ment. but a discharge. (see Pennsylrnnia 
Liquor Controi Bel. r. r ncmpim 111tn11 ( ·i)liij). !U of Rcvi<!tt'. i 6 7 Pa. Cmv,!th. 386. 392 (1994) 
Claimant resigned to ~t\ otd Uh-' rn:m,nent uischarge aml the Board properly treated Claimant's 
resignation/retirement as a discharge. ,11\o sec, Fuiliace v. Pon Awh. ofXew fork & Ne.r Jersey. 
130 A.D.2d 34 (1987)) 
Idaho case law and the well-reason,xi decisions of our sister states make it clear that when 
an employee has only the options to re':,ign ;_ir be terminated immediately. her resignation does 
not constitute a voiuntary scp:iration from employment but is and should be treated as a 
discharge. Further. \\.hik it nia: seem ~1 \\urk of legal absurdity to consider such. if a forced 
resignation 1s considered 1 \ ,,Juntar:, ,eparal ion from cmplo: ment being informed by ones 
employer that performing further work or reccivrng further compensation is no longer possible 
must certainly constitute good caus1; for an employee to quit. The record leaves no doubt that 
Claimant was to be terminated innnediateiy if she had not resigned. Claimant possessed no 
option to continue her \\l)rk \\ llh r,:·,pumk.'nt \c1:urd,ngi; Claimant asks this Court find that she 
was terminated and to re, ,:r:~c 1hc ..:kci:--it,n of the lndu::;trial C0mmission and reinstate Claimanf s 
unemployment benefits. 
IL THE ['\DUS TRI \L CO'vfi\HSS!ON ERRED AS A l\l"\TTER OF LAW OR ABLSED 
THEIR DISCRFTfO'-.. \VHF\: THEY PLb,(TD Tl ff BLRDEl\: OF PROOF AND 
PRESE:,T\: !O", 0\ ! HE CL \)\P,''-1 10 l'RO\T THE NQ:..;-EXISTE'\CE OF 
MlSCO\iOL C1. 
\Vhile the IIC based its Conclusion primarily on an error of law, that a forced resignation 
constitutes a voluntary separation from employment. the IIC gave an additional reason for its 
decision: --claimant has not demonstrated that her imminent discharge would have been for 
reasons other than misconduct." (R. Vo!.!. p. 22. L. 9-10) This ne,v shifting of the burden of 
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proof is completely at odd:-; ,-.itb well established !Jalw case law. '"The burden of prming 
misconduct by a prcponderam:,: of rhe evidence falls strict!) on the employer, and where the 
burden is not met. benefits must be awanlcd to the claimant. Rull 1·. City o/Jfiddleton. 105 Idaho 
22, 25. (1983): Porker 1·. St. jfurin f\n:u(id 101 ldaho-.J.15. 419. (1980). 
As stated by Examine1 Richmond. the Respondent ··presenttd no competent evidence to 
shmv that the claimant did Pot p,:ri~>rn1 hd job duties as ex.peeled or that she was discharged for 
misconduct .. :· (R .. VoL l p. :; i.. I b-1 i'). Th'-' clear burden of proof being \Vhat it is. Claimant 
understandably did not attempt to pit)\ c 1h,.: absence of misconduct in a hearing where 
Respondem presented , ,:r) littk a1 JU:lh.:n! th::11 Claimant had committed misconduct for the 
purposes of unemploymcnt eligibility. For the Commission to require Claimant to prove the 
absence of misconduct is a clear error of law. Because the IIC erred by imposing upon the 
Claimant the burden 10 pnne the ahsence or misconduct, and little to no competent evidence ,vas 
provided by Respondent to n'::-conduct. Cl0imant cmnot be :-aid to have been terminated 
for such. According!,:. the Ua1man'. ask:, this Cnurt tu rever<;e the decision of the Commission 
and r~instak her bendits from die d:;k her origina; digihility. 
Hi. THI::. hiJL:,iRL\L L·u;\!\ibSIU~ LRKt.i) .\S .\ \!ATTLR OF L\\\ OR ABCSED 
THEIR DlSCREri00. \\HE" fHEY ,Zl Lf'D !HAT CL\1\.1AJ\;I S \l!Sf \KES CONSTITLTED 
\HSCOc-sDLCT FOR l :\L\!i'L OY'dt'\T Pl 'RPOSES 
If the burden of proof to shov\ rnisconduct had been properly placed upon the 
Respondent. the IIC could not ha\ e ruled that Ciaimant \Vas ineligible for benefits due to 
misconduct during her employment. Idaho Admin. Coder. 09.01 .30.275 has defined misconduct 
as follov,s: 
02. Disqualifying '.\'1iscon<luct. \1isconduct that disqualifies a claimant for 
benefits must be connected with d1e claimant's employment and involve one of the 
following: 
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a. Disregard of Employer's Interest. A willful. intentional disregard of the 
employer's interest. 
b. Violation of Reasonable.' Rules. A deliberate \iolation of the employer's 
reasonable rules. 
c. Disregard of StanJarJs ol Behm ior. lf the allet!ed misconduct involves a 
~ ~ 
disregard of a stand .. ud uf hd!~!\ Lir which the ,.:mp!o) er has a right to expect of his 
employees. there is no L:,j'.iir,..:;L:m [hat ti1,.: cL1irndnt, conduct be willfuL 
intentionaL or deliberate. The claimant's subjecti \ e state of mind is irrelevant. The 
test for misconduct in .. standard of behavior cases" is as follows: 
i. Whether the claimant's conduct fell belovv the standard of behavior expected by 
the employer: and 
ii. Whether the empioyer·~· e··~pectation \vas objective!) reasonable in the particular 
case. 
The l!C ruled that Claimant's missteps constituted a disregard of the Respondent's standards of 
beha\ ior and constitutes misconduct under section ( c ). 
Under the tv,o prong test contained in section (c) above. an expectation is reasonable 
under the circumstances'"- hen it i:-, ,:omrnunicated to the l'.mployee. unless that expectation flows 
naturall) from the empl,J) n11.:m r(·ictli,1"~,iup. This conummicatillll ::,tandard .. is higher and more 
specific than what ½ould be ncce"sary :,tmply to discharge an employee for cause:· Harris v. 
E!ec. Wholesale. 141 Idaho 1. 4 (2()0-l) 
Respondent argued w h,:at ini:; frul tllt:y expect tha.:'ir employees not to make errors and the 
IIC ruled that this is an o~jecti \ d: rec1sonable expectation. However. under this analysis. all an 
employer must do to avoid unemployment benefits is create a company policy stating that 
mistakes are unacceptable. communicate such to employees. and terminate employees according 
to this policy. In order h-1 pn.:>v-:1F this, the Idaho A<lministrati\e Code pro,ides clarification as to 
\vhat type of conduct cannot constitute misconduct. One type of conduct is non-work related 
conduct the other is found in Idaho .-\dmin. Code r. 09.01.30.275(3 ): 
03. Inability to Perform or Ordinary Negligence. Mere inefficiency. 
unsatisfactory conduct. failure or good performance as the result of inability or 
incapacitv. inad\crtencies. iso!ated inst:mces of ordinary negligence. or good faith 
.; ,., ....._, ......, V 
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errors in judgment or ---tiscr-:l;on an.: not ..:un:-:,idered rnisconduct connected with 
employment. 
The Idaho Supreme Court prn\1ded clarification on this issue in rVroh!e r. Bonners Ferry Ranger 
5/tation, --while an employer may mak1.: almost any kind of a rule for the conduct of his 
employees and under some circumstanct;S may be able to discharge an employee for violation of 
any rule. such does not, per se. amount to ·misconduct· constituting a bar to unemployment 
compensation benefits.'' 97 Idaho 900. 902. ( 1976) 
Respondent ,vl10 bears the burden of proving misconduct. cites no section of its 
handbook that was violat..::d. ;nak...::-- ;1u argurn-:nt 1hat Claimant refused to follow any procedures 
laid out by her supervi:;uc ciks !l(l hehavior or conduct out::;ide of inadvertencies that could be 
considered ootential miscondu..:L ::::.rd r1rn, ide:-; no CtHno.:tent e\ idence to suggest that Claimant's 
.i l ._,._, 
errors ,vere anything more than ordinary inadvertencies made during good faith efforts to 
complete her work duties. UaimaEt tt.::c;tified that she att.:mpted to comply with everything her 
employer had asked her to. C1aimant vvas dealing with health and vision issues during this time. 
Respondent elected to terminate Claimant after thirteen years of service instead of continuing to 
\\ork with her through th~::;e i:,sues. \Vhik this i:-; c1..:rtainly Respondenf s right in at will 
employment relationship. Claimaiif s mere inetlic1ency and inadvertent mistakes do not 
constitute misconduct barring Claimant from rc:ceiving unemployment benefits and are not 
grounds for denying her unc?mployment compensation benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Idaho Fmplu: n1,.·,1t Security .\ct was enactcJ to help alkviate the economic and 
social hardships caused hY unemployment\\ hich did not result from the fault of the 
employee. LC s 72-1302. The ,3-ct must he lihcra!!y construed to dfoct that purpose. In re 
Potlatch Forests, Inc .. 72 Idaho 29! (1952). Claimant did everything she could to retain her 
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employment and vvas forced to resign despite her good faith efforts. The IIC erred as a matter of 
law \\hen it found that Claimant's fi_)rced res;gnation constituted a ,oluntary separation from 
employment. The IIC al:-;o in...:orrectly pla...:cd the burden of proof on Claimant to show that she 
was not terminated for misconduct. Thi::, error of la\\ regarding the burden of proof caused the 
UC to incorrectly ruk that Ciairnant commilh:J misconduct. The record reflects that Clairnanf s 
mistakes were due to ordinary negligence: and not due to any disregard for the Respondent's 
standards of beh:.n ior. i herd<..m:. Ciaim..un asks this Court to reverse the decision of the 
Commission and reinstate her unemplo:, m,:nt compensation benefits. 
7~ 
DATED THI8:'(JJ_ day of.July. 2014 
.. (;reg Lawson 
,1Jtomey for the Appellant-Claimant 
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